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INTRODUCTION 
There is fundamental tension between copyright doctrine and the 
First Amendment right to free speech—at least, theoretically there 
should be.1  In the most basic terms:  the First Amendment protects 
expression while copyright law regulates it.2  The First Amendment 
prohibits government actions that restrict people’s freedom of 
speech.3  Copyright, on the other hand, is a government creation that 
restricts speech by prohibiting people from using certain words or 
images in their expression.4  However, the relationship between copy-
 
  J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2011; B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, 2007. 
 1 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 984 
(1970) (“[C]opyright persists in its potential for conflict with the [F]irst 
[A]mendment.”); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms 
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 538 (2004) (“The current version 
of copyright . . . is incompatible with the First Amendment.”).  Even Professor Melville B. 
Nimmer, who first spelled out how copyright and the First Amendment avoid conflict, 
notes that “views of copyright and the first amendment, held ‘side by side,’ may, in fact, 
be contradictory.”  Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaran-
tees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1180 (1970). 
 2 See Brief of Jack M. Balkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (representing the view of a group of scholars 
that “[t]he Copyright Act is a statute that regulates speech.  It tells some people that they 
cannot print or publicly present certain words or images”); see also Goldstein, supra note 
1, at 984 (“Dispensed by the government, copyright . . . constitutes the grant of a mono-
poly over expression.”). 
 3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”). 
 4 As Nimmer rhetorically asked: 
Does not the Copyright Act fly directly in the face of [the First Amendment]?  Is it 
not precisely a “law” made by Congress which abridges the “freedom of speech” 
and “of the press” in that it punishes expressions by speech and press when such 
expressions consist of the unauthorized use of material protected by copyright?   
  Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1181.  In other words, as Professors Mark A. Lemley and Eugene 
Volokh succinctly put it:  “Copyright law restricts speech:  it restricts you from writing, 
painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you please.”  Mark A. 
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147, 165–66 (1998). 
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right and free speech is not all conflict and discord.5  The Supreme 
Court has noted that copyright and the First Amendment essentially 
share one goal:  wide dissemination of expression and ideas.6  Copy-
right gives authors a limited monopoly over their creative works so 
that they can reap the financial rewards of their creation, thus incen-
tivizing authors to create in the first place.7  As the Supreme Court 
put it:  “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression.  By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s ex-
pression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dis-
seminate ideas.”8  Copyright is therefore, at its theoretical core, large-
ly compatible with the First Amendment’s protection of free speech:  
copyright ensures that there is speech being created for the First 
Amendment to protect.9 
This congruence in purpose—to promote speech—seems to sug-
gest that despite the potential for conflict between copyright and the 
First Amendment, there is also potential for solution. 
Accordingly, courts have been reluctant to recognize any real con-
flict between copyright and the First Amendment.  Courts are confi-
dent that copyright has built-in safeguards that properly balance the 
protection of copyright holders’ rights and allowing freedom of 
speech. 
 
 5 See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 
(Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 308 (2009) (“[T]he subject of 
both [the First Amendment and Copyright Clause] is the same:  communication by both 
speech and writing.”). 
 6 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[C]opyright’s limited monopolies are 
compatible with free speech principles.  Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the cre-
ation and publication of free expression.”); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and 
a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347 (1996) (“First, through its production 
function, copyright encourages creative expression . . . . Second, through its structural 
function, copyright serves to further the democratic character of public discourse.”).  But 
see Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright:  Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 463, 478–79 (2010) (stating that one of the reasons “why the First Amendment has 
not been a more successful defense in copyright cases” is precisely because “copyright has 
been deemed an ‘engine of free expression,’ and accordingly . . . treated as a symbiotic 
pair [with the First Amendment,] working together toward the same goal of promoting 
more speech”). 
 7 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The monopoly created by copyright . . . rewards the individual author in 
order to benefit the public.”). 
 8 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 9 Put another way:  “The Copyright Clause . . . is relevant to the First Amendment in that it 
protects the right of access to learning materials.”  PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 5, at 
308. 
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The conventional wisdom in the literature, on the other hand, is 
that courts’ trust in copyright’s internal free speech safeguards is 
misplaced—the supposed safeguards relied upon are simply too un-
certain in application to effectively prevent copyright from encroach-
ing on free speech. 
This Comment will first discuss the conflict between copyright and 
the First Amendment in more detail.  Part II will explain how the 
courts have thus far chosen to deal with the conflict by relying on 
copyright’s supposed internal safeguards.  Part III will discuss why, 
contrary to courts’ reliance on them, many commentators find that 
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine do not ade-
quately reconcile copyright and the First Amendment because of 
their uncertain application.  Lastly, the Comment will, by applying a 
generalized understanding of recent highly contextual behavioral 
studies on how people react to legal uncertainty to the particular con-
text of copyright law, explore how and why eliminating the legal un-
certainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine may 
actually further burden free speech interests rather than accommo-
date them. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to disprove the conventional 
wisdom or propose a new solution to the copyright/free speech con-
undrum but to highlight new considerations to be explored in eva-
luating suggested solutions for bridging copyright and free speech. 
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT VS. COPYRIGHT 
The Copyright Clause provides that “Congress shall have Pow-
er . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings.”10  Congress has done so through the Copyright 
Act, which grants an individual the right to exclude others from cer-
tain uses of his copyrighted work.11  Section 102 of the Act extends 
copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”12  Section 106 gives the copyright 
owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative 
works, distribute copies, and perform or display the work in public.13  
 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.  This is also the Patent Clause.  The entire unabridged clause 
reads:  “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
 11 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–801 (2006). 
 12 Id. § 102. 
 13 Id. § 106.  The entire section reads: 
1474 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:5 
 
On the other hand, the First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.”14 
While there is some debate over whether enforcement of copy-
right law constitutes state action, general consensus is that it does.15  
At the very least, the conflict is clear whenever a court enforces a cop-
yright because it is essentially putting a restraint on what may be said 
or heard in public when it does so.  Preliminary injunctions sought 
before trial on the merits are the classic form of a “prior restraint”:  
they are judicial orders forbidding certain communications issued be-
fore such communications actually occur.16  And the Supreme Court 
 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has 
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:  
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work 
publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission.   
  Id. 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The full Amendment reads:  “Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id. 
 15 See Rothman, supra note 6, at 507 (“Although there is disagreement about whether the 
private enforcement of federal laws counts as state action, the general consensus in copy-
right cases is that it does.”); Peter K. Yu, Copyright USA—A Collection:  The Surging Influence 
of Copyright Law in American Life; The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1398 (2010) 
(“[C]ommentators have widely debated whether enforcement of copyright law could 
constitute state action . . . .”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1607 
n.400 (1993) (“Enforcement of property rights should be acknowledged as state action.”); 
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 4, at 185 n.179 (“There’s no doubt that a court’s enforce-
ment of copyright law to restrict private speech constitutes state action.”); Tushnet, supra 
note 1, at 538 (“[I]f the First Amendment bars only government action, then copyright 
law itself ought to be unconstitutional as a government restriction on some speakers in 
order to improve the relative position of others.”). 
 16 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1st ed. 1984)) (“The term ‘prior restraint’ is used 
‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when is-
sued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.’”); see also Lemley & 
Volokh, supra note 4, at 169 (“[C]opyright law is a speech restriction.  Accordingly, in-
junctions against distributing a supposedly infringing work are injunctions restraining 
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has declared that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the 
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights.”17  Yet, preliminary injunctions are “issue[d] as a matter 
of course in copyright cases.”18 
But even absent an injunction, “[t]he current version of copy-
right . . . is incompatible with the First Amendment.”19  As Professor 
Rebecca Tushnet notes, copying—even pure copying—embodies im-
portant First Amendment interests.20  This is true whether one 
grounds free speech on the theory of individual autonomy or of self-
governance (or even, suggests Tushnet, any other theory).21  Copying 
promotes the interests of any accounts of free speech.22  Tushnet pro-
vides many examples of instances where copying served a vital free 
speech purpose23—instances of self-expression and political persua-
sion, where “[p]ersonality [was] expressed inseparably from copy-
ing,”24 or where, because “[s]ome speech lacks a substitute,” copying 
was necessary to public discourse as a way to persuade.25  And yet, in 
spite of copying’s importance to First Amendment interests, copy-
right law largely circumscribes it, subjugating many would-be copiers, 
i.e., speakers, to the will of copyright rightsholders.  The conflict is 
 
speech; and preliminary injunctions restraining speech are generally considered uncons-
titutional ‘prior restraints.’”). 
 17 Neb. Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 18 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 890 (2007); see also Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 
600, 612–13 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that in copyright cases, where the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits prong of the test for whether a preliminary injunction should issue is 
convincingly met, the balance of the harms prong should be ignored, even if defendant 
would suffer greater harm than the plaintiff were the injunction not granted, because “a 
probable infringer simply should not be allowed to continue to profit from its continuing 
illegality at the copyright owner’s expense”); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript 
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that in copyright cases, where the likelih-
ood of success on the merits prong of the test for whether a preliminary injunction 
should issue is met, the irreparable injury prong need not be proved with much detail, 
“because such injury can normally be presumed when a copyright is infringed”); Conrad 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding 
that in copyright cases, “[a]n injunction . . . should issue if plaintiff can show a reasonable 
probability of prevailing on the merits,” without mentioning the other three prongs of 
the test for whether preliminary injunction should issue).  For a good discussion of the 
leniency of the standards governing preliminary injunctions in modern U.S. copyright 
cases, see generally Lemley & Volokh, supra note 4, at 151–65. 
 19 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 538. 
 20 See id. at 562–81. 
 21 See id. at 538–40. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See id. 
 24 Id. at 571. 
 25 Id. at 578. 
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fundamental.  As Professor Tushnet put it, “any system of copyright 
will suppress speech, and some of that speech will be quite valuable in 
constitutional terms.”26  The key is thus finding the optimal balance. 
II.  COPYRIGHT’S INTERNAL FREE SPEECH SAFEGUARDS 
Despite the ostensibly inherent conflict between copyright doc-
trine and free speech interests, courts have rarely conducted First 
Amendment analyses in copyright cases, and even when they have, 
First Amendment challenges in copyright cases have been dismissed 
with surprising ease.27  In Eldred v. Reno, the D.C. Circuit even went so 
far as to declare that “copyrights are categorically immune from chal-
lenges under the First Amendment.”28  The Supreme Court somewhat 
tempered the D.C. Circuit’s statement in Eldred v. Ashcroft, stating that 
it “recognize[d] that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it de-
clared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under the 
First Amendment,’” but nonetheless reiterated that 
“when . . . Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copy-
right protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”29  
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have dismissed First Amend-
ment challenges in copyright cases on the theory that “copyright law 
contains built-in First Amendment accommodations,”30 namely:  (1) 
the idea/expression dichotomy and (2) fair use doctrine. 
A. Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
The idea/expression dichotomy within copyright doctrine deli-
neates what can be privately monopolized under copyright and what 
cannot.31  Copyright does not protect an author’s “ideas,” only his 
“expression.”32  For example, the fact that Jane Yolen had already 
written a novel about a teenage wizard in magic school did not prec-
 
 26 Id. at 547 (emphasis added). 
 27 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) 
(“[C]ourts have consistently and almost without exception rejected the free speech de-
fense in copyright infringement actions.”). 
 28 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 29 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 30 See, e.g., id. at 190. 
 31 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1189–90 (considering where the line between idea and 
expression ought to be drawn).  Also, this principle of copyright is codified by statute.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, il-
lustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1189–90. 
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lude J.K Rowling from writing a series of best-selling books about a 
teenage wizard in magic school.33  Other authors are not allowed to 
copy Jane Yolen’s or J.K. Rowling’s words and are very likely not al-
lowed to use the same characters, specific plot points, dialogue, or 
the like, but other authors are allowed to write a novel about a tee-
nage wizard in magic school.34  The general “teenage wizard in magic 
school” plot is an unprotected idea, whereas J.K. Rowling’s particular 
expression of that idea—e.g., her words—is protected.  As Professor 
Neil Weinstock Netanel put it:  speakers may “convey the ideas and 
facts contained within the copyright holder’s work . . . so long as they 
do so in words, graphics, or other expressive components that are not 
‘substantially similar’ to those that comprise the copyright holder’s 
work.”35 
The idea/expression dichotomy is the line on which copyright 
and free speech is balanced.  As Professor Melville B. Nimmer, the 
first to articulate this concept in 1970, put it:  “ideas per se fall on the 
free speech side of the line, while the statement of an idea in specific 
form, as well as the selection and arrangement of ideas fall on the 
copyright side of the line.”36 
This balance serves both copyright and First Amendment inter-
ests.37  This balance serves the interest of copyright because the pro-
tection of authors’ works through protection of their expression al-
lows authors to financially benefit from their expression, 
incentivizing the creation of new works.38  Free speech interests are 
served because people are still free to speak about any idea they want 
to as long as they do not adopt the particular expression of a prior 
author.39  In this way, the “market place of ideas” is not left “utterly 
bereft” and “democratic dialogue” is not “stifled.”40  In short, copy-
right avoids conflict with the First Amendment because it already en-
 
 33 Compare JANE YOLEN, WIZARD’S HALL (1991), with J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE 
SORCERER’S STONE (1998). 
 34 It is true, however, that it is often difficult to determine at what point “idea” becomes 
“expression” or vice versa.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 35 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 13–14 (2001). 
 36 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1190. 
 37 See id. at 1192–93. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See Netanel, supra 35, at 13 (“[W]hile a speaker might prefer to incorporate the copyright 
holder’s expression, there will almost always be ample alternative formulations by which 
the speaker may express the ideas she wishes to convey.”).  But see Tushnet, supra note 1, 
at 578 (“Some speech lacks a substitute.”). 
 40 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1189. 
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compasses free speech interests by only protecting expression and 
not ideas. 
This concept has been enormously influential.41  Since Nimmer’s 
revelatory 1970 article, courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
used the idea/expression dichotomy to quickly throw out First 
Amendment defenses to copyright claims with ease.42  For example, in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, an infringement ac-
tion was brought against The Nation Magazine for its unauthorized 
publication of verbatim quotes from President Ford’s memoirs, the 
rights to which were owned by Harper & Row.43  Defendant argued 
that since President Ford’s memoirs were important to democratic 
political discourse, in light of First Amendment values, the maga-
zine’s unauthorized copying should have been exempted from liabili-
ty.44  The Court rejected defendant’s contention.45  The Court cited 
to, inter alia, Nimmer and found such an exemption unnecessary.  
According to the Court, as long as copyright only protected expres-
sion and not ideas, First Amendment interests were properly served.46 
 
 41 See Matthew D. Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone:  The Puzzling Absence of Independent 
First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 282 
(2009) (“Nimmer’s definitional balancing formulation proved enormously influential.  It 
was picked up by lower courts and, eventually, by the Supreme Court.”). 
 42 For a better picture of the cases adopting Nimmer’s idea/expression dichotomy, Netanel 
gives a brief overview of the evolution of Nimmer’s judicial progeny.  See Netanel, supra 
35, at 7–12.  There, Netanel cites a number of district court cases that invoke Nimmer in 
rejecting First Amendment defenses to copyright suits.  See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group 
Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 383–84 (D. Conn. 1972) (“[I]nsofar as [defendants] 
chose ‘to avoid the expenditure of time and skill necessary to evolve their own expres-
sions, and instead copied the plaintiff’s expression, there can be no first amendment jus-
tification for such copying.’” (internal citation omitted)); Jondara Music Publ’g Co. v. 
Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494, 499 (D.N.J. 1973) (rejecting defendants’ First 
Amendment defense easily, stating that “[s]ince defendants concede they copy the crea-
tive works of others [the court] perceive[s] no first amendment issue”); see also Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (“[C]opyright law does not ab-
ridge the First Amendment because it does not restrain the communication of ideas or 
concepts . . . . ” (citing Nimmer, supra note 1)). 
 43 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541–42 (1985). 
 44 Id. at 555–56.  More specifically, defendant argued that fair use doctrine should be ex-
panded to encompass their conduct.  For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see discus-
sion infra Part III.B. 
 45 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 46 Id. at 555–60. 
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B. Fair Use Doctrine 
Copyright’s other internal free speech safeguard is fair use.47  The 
fair use doctrine was originally a judge-made equitable doctrine but 
was codified by the Copyright Act of 1976.48  Unlike the 
idea/expression dichotomy, which is essentially a label describing 
what is properly protected by copyright, i.e., what is copyrightable 
and when copying constitutes infringement, fair use is an affirmative 
defense that arises after infringement is established that excludes 
“the fair use of a copyrighted work” from liability.49  The statute pro-
vides four non-exclusive50 factors to be analyzed when determining 
whether the use of a work in any particular case is fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the ef-
fect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.51 
Most important to courts it seems are inquiries into whether the bor-
rowing work is “transformative” under the first factor, that is whether 
it adds new material or a new critical perspective to the original,52 and 
whether there exists a traditional licensing market for the copy-
righted work under the fourth factor.53 
Fair use acts as a “safety valve” for free speech:  it allows a court to 
permit technical infringement of a copyright in certain situations 
where speech may be overburdened.54  Fair use doctrine’s utility as a 
 
 47 In fact, it has even been called “the most important and far reaching” internal free 
speech safeguard.  Patterson, supra note 27, at 36 (“Of the . . . free speech constraints im-
plicit in copyright . . . fair use . . . is the most important and far reaching.  Eliminate the 
other [free speech constraints], and a rational fair use doctrine can protect the rights of 
free speech.”). 
 48 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 49 Id. (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). 
 50 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, pt. 1, at 65 (1976) (“[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the 
question must be decided on its own facts.”); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (“The 
factors enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive.”). 
 51 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 52 See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 550 (“[F]air use increasingly requires transformation, that is, 
the addition of new material or a new, critical perspective.”). 
 53 See Gibson, supra note 18, at 898 (“Scholars of all stripes thus agree with the courts:  the 
existence vel non of traditional licensing markets should play an important role in deter-
mining whether fair use protects an unauthorized use of copyrighted material.”). 
 54 See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech:  Constitutional Limitations on the Protection 
of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 293 (1979) (“[The idea/expression dichotomy] func-
tions effectively in any situation in which the purposes of free speech are adequately 
served by preserving the free access to ideas, without the need for similar access to a par-
ticular form of expression.  In some instances, however, the values inherent in the rights 
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free speech protection lies in the fact that “[i]t can operate as a de-
fense even when there has been a substantial appropriation of ex-
pression.”55  Fair use allows for the few circumstances when free 
speech interests require the use of another’s particular expression 
and not just his idea, i.e., when the idea/expression dichotomy is in-
adequate as free speech protection.56 
As with the idea/expression dichotomy, courts have used the exis-
tence of the fair use doctrine to easily dispose of First Amendment 
defenses in copyright cases.57  For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., a number of record companies and music publishers 
sued Napster, an Internet service that facilitated the transmission and 
retention of digital audio files by its users, for copyright infringe-
ment.58  The district court had preliminarily enjoined Napster “from 
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, upload-
ing, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical com-
positions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state 
law, without express permission of the rights owner.”59  Napster ap-
pealed, arguing, inter alia, that the preliminary injunction violated 
the First Amendment.60  While the Ninth Circuit found that the in-
junction was overbroad and remanded it for modification on other 
grounds, it nevertheless addressed Napster’s First Amendment de-
 
of free speech and free press demand more than access to abstract ideas—they require 
the use of the particular form of expression contained in a copyrighted work . . . . A more 
broadly applicable restraint against the intrusion of copyright law into constitutional pre-
serves is the doctrine of fair use.”). 
 55 Id. at 294. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“We . . . briefly address Napster’s First Amendment argument so that it is not reasserted 
on remand . . . . We note that First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by the 
presence of the fair use doctrine.”); see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. 
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the Second Circuit has “repeatedly 
rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the 
ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair 
use doctrine”); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“[E]xcept perhaps in an extraordinary case, ‘the fair use doctrine encompasses all 
claims of first amendment in the copyright field.’” (quoting New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Hen-
ry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989))); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. 
Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The deter-
mination that the defense of fair use could not be successfully asserted here would seem 
to resolve the further contention that the First Amendment works to prevent issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.”). 
 58 A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1010–11. 
 59 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000), rev’d, 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 60 A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1027–28. 
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fense and rejected it with a few sentences, stating:  “First Amendment 
concerns in copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use doc-
trine. . . . There was a preliminary determination here that Napster 
users are not fair users.  Uses of copyrighted material that are not fair 
uses are rightfully enjoined.”61 
III.  INSUFFICIENCY OF COPYRIGHT’S INTERNAL 
FREE SPEECH SAFEGUARDS:  UNCERTAINTY 
Contrary to courts’ reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy 
and fair use doctrine, several commentators have nevertheless found 
copyright’s internal free speech safeguards lacking.62 
The one essential criticism is that the idea/expression dichotomy 
and fair use doctrine are too uncertain in application to effectively 
protect free speech interests.63 
A. Uncertainty of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
For many commentators, the supposed distinction between idea 
and expression is illusory.64  While stylized as a “dichotomy,” the ac-
tual relationship between idea and expression is anything but binary.  
Rather, the distinction (if it exists at all) between idea and expression 
 
 61 Id. at 1028 (citations omitted). 
 62 See Bunker, supra 41, at 292 (“Neither the idea/expression dichotomy nor the fair use 
doctrine is adequate, either together or separately, to protect First Amendment values in 
the copyright realm.”); Netanel, supra note 35, at 13 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy, 
the fair use doctrine, and copyright’s limited term do not continue to adequately protect 
free speech.”); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 396–97 (1989) (“[It is] 
apparent that reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy to reconcile copyright with the 
first amendment is unjustified.  Even though copyright theoretically aims only at constitu-
tionally valueless speech, judicial interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy has 
failed to leave ample room for constitutionally valuable expression.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 35, at 19–20 (“The First Amendment protection afforded by 
copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy is no less uncertain, unstable and illusory than 
the dichotomy itself. . . . [F]air use suffers from . . . the same infirmity as the 
idea/expression dichotomy.”); see also Kathleen K. Olsen, First Amendment Values in Fair 
Use Analysis, 5 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. MONOGRAPHS 161, 189 (2004) (“[T]he courts’ 
ad hoc decision-making has prevented the construction of a coherent body of fair use law 
based on a fundamental commitment to preserving free speech values.  This in and of it-
self is harmful to the preservation of First Amendment values.”). 
 64 See Netanel, supra note 35, at 19 (“[T]he problem is not merely that expression has steadi-
ly gobbled up idea, but that there is no clear line between idea and expression.”); Yen, 
supra note 62, at 405 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy does not provide a clear, prin-
cipled separation between the first amendment and copyright law.”). 
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is better conceptualized as a continuum.65  The difference (if it can be 
called that) between copyright protected “expression” and unpro-
tected free speech “idea” is one of degree.66 
Courts have been unable to locate the point at which idea magi-
cally becomes expression in any principled manner.67  For example, 
one test that has been developed to identify the line between idea 
and expression is the “abstractions test” applied by Judge Learned 
Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.68  Yet, even as he applied his 
test for determining when something had crossed from idea into ex-
pression, Judge Hand noted that the line between idea and expres-
sion, “wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary.”69 
In Nichols, a playwright sued Universal Pictures, a movie produc-
tion company, alleging its movie, The Cohens and the Kellys, infringed 
the copyright on her play, Abie’s Irish Rose.70  Both works involved “a 
quarrel between a Jewish father and an Irish father, the marriage of 
their children, the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation.”71  
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that defendant did not in-
fringe Nichol’s copyright, stating that “the defendant took no 
more . . . than the law allowed.”72 
Judge Hand found no infringement using what is now called the 
“abstractions test.”  Any given work can be described in a number of 
ways.  For example, a description of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet73 
could include every last detail of the play, specifying the names of 
every character big and small, every scene, every line of dialogue, and 
 
 65 See Yen, supra note 62, at 433 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy is at best a very 
amorphous distinction, one which plausibly may be construed to imply either an ex-
tremely broad scope of copyright protection or a very narrow one.”). 
 66 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1018 (“Recognizing that expression is no more than an ar-
ticulated idea or ideas and that the distinction is one of degree only, the law operates by 
degrees in determining whether a work’s content is protectable or has been infringed by 
another work.”); see also Yen, supra note 62, at 433 (“The examination revealed that the 
idea/expression dichotomy is at best a very amorphous distinction, one which plausibly 
may be construed to imply either an extremely broad scope of copyright protection or a 
very narrow one.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Bunker, supra note 41, at 286–87 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy . . . is so 
uncertain in application as to be nearly indeterminate in some cases.”).  Even the Su-
preme Court has remarked on the seeming futility of attempting to parse idea from ex-
pression, stating in a seminal free speech case:  “[W]e cannot indulge the facile assump-
tion that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of 
suppressing ideas in the process.”  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 68 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 69 Id. at 122. 
 70 Id. at 120. 
 71 Id. at 122. 
 72 Id. at 121. 
 73 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET. 
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so on, or it could simply and just as truthfully be described as a love 
story.  The former is undeniably protected expression and the latter, 
clearly unprotected idea.  Between those two extremes lie an infinite 
number of different descriptions of differing amounts of detail, each 
no truer than the other.  Judge Hand’s “abstractions test” posits that 
at some point along that continuum expression becomes unprotecta-
ble idea.74 
However, even as Judge Hand applied the test, he noted that 
“[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever 
can.”75  Judge Hand’s admission is particularly troubling considering 
his opinion is frequently cited to as the best test for separating idea 
from expression.76 
Instead, courts repeatedly redraw the line between idea and ex-
pression on an ad hoc case-by-case basis.77  Compare the Second Cir-
cuit’s holding in Nichols discussed above, that protection of a literary 
character depends on how finely the character is delineated,78 with 
the standard in Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
where the Ninth Circuit found that copyright covers only the fictional 
character that “really constitutes the story being told.”79 
Further, compare the way Judge Hand applied the “abstractions 
test” in Nichols to the way the Ninth Circuit applied the same test in 
 
 74 Judge Hand stated it as follows:   
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.  
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the 
play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this 
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the 
playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expres-
sion, his property is never extended.   
  Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983); Burroughs v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]n attempt-
ing to distill the unprotected idea from the protected expression.  No court or commen-
tator in making this search has been able to improve upon Judge Learned Hand’s famous 
‘abstractions test.’”); Yen, supra note 62, at 405 (“[T]he consensus view is that Hand’s at-
tempt to solve the idea/expression dichotomy is the best effort to date.”). 
 77 See Netanel, supra note 35, at 19 (“The idea/expression dichotomy is notoriously mallea-
ble and indeterminate, far more useful as a shorthand for justifying judges’ case-by-case 
conclusions.”); see also Yen, supra note 62, at 397 (“Problems connected with separating 
idea from expression have caused many copyright decisions to rest upon the courts’ ad 
hoc sense of what is permissible copying rather than upon any tangible principles.”). 
 78 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can be copy-
righted.”). 
 79 Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). 
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Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.80 and Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,81 which “strongly suggest[ed] that 
the very mood a work creates constitutes its protectable expres-
sion”82—a seemingly much higher “level of abstraction” than where 
Judge Hand drew the line in Nichols. 
Roth Greeting involved two corporations in the greeting card busi-
ness.83  One sued the other for copyright infringement of its greeting 
cards.84  The Ninth Circuit found that defendant copied plaintiff’s 
protected expression by copying the “total concept and feel” of its 
works, which included, in part, “the mood they portrayed.”85 
In Sid & Marty Krofft, a television production company sued 
McDonald’s Corporation, claiming that certain McDonald’s television 
commercials aimed at children infringed upon one of its children’s 
television series.86  Defendant admitted copying the idea of plaintiff’s 
work—it also created “a fantasyland filled with diverse and fanciful 
characters in action”—but argued that it did not copy plaintiff’s ex-
pression.87  As proof, defendant dissected the two works and pointed 
out the dissimilarities in characters, setting, and plot.88  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, ignored the defendant’s analysis, calling it “impro-
per,” and found infringement because “the total concept and feel” of 
the two works were substantially similar.89 
The line between idea and expression simply cannot be reliably 
pinned down.  Judge Hand admitted as much when he noted:  “no 
principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copy-
ing the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression,’” and that such “de-
cisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”90 
B. Uncertainty of Fair Use Doctrine 
For many commentators, the fair use doctrine is equally, if not 
more, ambiguous than the idea/expression line.91 
 
 80 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 81 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 82 Yen, supra note 62, at 411. 
 83 Roth Greeting Cards, 429 F.2d at 1107. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1110. 
 86 Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1160–61. 
 87 Id. at 1165. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1165–67. 
 90 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 91 See Netanel, supra note 35, at 21 (“[C]ommentators have bemoaned [fair use doctrine’s] 
unprincipled, inconsistent application.”); see also Bunker, supra note 41, at 288 (“In terms 
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As a non-exclusive multi-factor balancing test, fair use doctrine is 
almost inevitably amorphous.92  One district court called it “excep-
tionally elusive, even for the law.”93  Further, since “[f]air use analy-
sis . . . always calls for case-by-case analysis,” case law has not helped 
clarify what constitutes fair use.94 
For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme 
Court found that a work that took from and parodied a prior work 
was transformative, and thus more likely fair use despite its commer-
cial purpose, because it added “new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage” to the prior work.95  In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Castle 
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., focused heavily 
on purpose.  It held that a work that took from a prior work was not 
transformative, and thus less likely fair use, because of its “lack of 
transformative purpose,” without examining whether it actually add-
ed anything to the prior work.96  And in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin 
Books USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit instead focused on whether a work 
was a parody.97  It found that a work mimicking the style of a child-
ren’s book to tell the story of the infamous O.J. Simpson murder trial 
was not transformative despite clear differences between the two 
works because “the critical issue . . . is whether [the work in question] 
is a parody” and the work had “no critical bearing on the substance 
or style of” the original and was thus not a “parody.”98 
It is exceptionally difficult to predict how a court will apply the 
fair use test, let alone forecast what it will ultimately find in any par-
ticular case.  As a result, there is “confusion regarding the scope and 
 
of legal uncertainty, the idea/expression dichotomy is child’s play next to the fair use 
doctrine.”); Darren Hudson Hick, Mystery and Misdirection:  Some Problems of Fair Use and 
Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485 (2009) (criticizing fair use doctrine for of-
fering no reasonable means by which one might predict the outcome of any particular 
case). 
 92 See Bunker, supra note 41, at 288 (“As the multi-factor ‘nonexclusive’ test suggests, the 
doctrine is notoriously ambiguous.”). 
 93 Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 94 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that “[t]he task” of finding fair use “is not to be simpli-
fied with bright-line rules, for . . . [it] calls for case-by-case analysis”); Gideon Parcho-
movsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007) (“The 
judicial path of fair use is paved with split courts, reversed decisions, and inconsistent 
opinions.”). 
 95 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 96 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142–43. 
 97 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 98 Id. (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580). 
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nature of fair use.”99  “As it currently exists . . . the fair use doctrine is 
irrational.”100  There is simply no reasoned way to reliably differentiate 
between infringer and fair user. 
C. Effect of Uncertainty 
For critics of copyright’s supposed internal safeguards, the legal 
uncertainty involved with the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
doctrine preclude them from effectively protecting free speech.101  
Even worse, the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine, 
due to their imprecision, not only fail as free speech safeguards but 
also have a “chilling effect” on speech and affirmatively hinder free 
speech.102 
Copyright’s suppression of speech “may be direct,” as when a 
speaker is enjoined from copying, but it may also “result from a chill-
ing effect caused by legal uncertainty.”103  Indeed, the most damning 
 
 99 Patterson, supra note 27, at 44. 
100 Id. at 36. 
101 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 402–03 (2009) 
(“Given the constitutional interests at stake, the standards-based approach of fair use law 
is troubling.  Whether any particular use is fair should not be unknowable until a judge 
interprets the fair use standards and decides a case that has made its way to court.  In-
deed, the uncertainty of fair use law is in tension with . . . First Amendment principles.”); 
Netanel, supra note 35, at 19 (“[G]iven the ad hoc nature of distinguishing idea from ex-
pression, how are speakers to know whether their speech is infringing reproduction or 
permissible reformulation of existing expression?”); see also Bunker, supra note 41, at 287–
88 (“[U]uncertainty is immensely problematic from a free speech perspective.”).  But see 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990) (dis-
cussing whether the imprecision and lack of clarity of fair use doctrine is a strength or a 
weakness and concluding that a bright-line standard should not be adopted unless it is a 
good one, and that no such standard currently exists). 
102 See Netanel, supra note 35, at 19–20 (“At the very least, the idea/expression dichotomy’s 
very vagueness induces considerable speaker self-censorship.  Copyright supposedly en-
courages speakers to incorporate and build upon existing ideas.  But given the indeter-
minate character of the idea/expression dichotomy, speakers who seek to do so often risk 
finding themselves on the receiving end of a copyright infringement action.  That chill-
ing effect alone ought to give pause to any court willing to examine afresh the dichoto-
my’s efficacy as a limiting principle for protecting First Amendment interests.”); see also 
Olsen, supra note 62, at 189 (“[W]ithout consistent principles for applying fair use, po-
tential users cannot be sure what is and is not permissible.  The uncertainty may create a 
‘chilling effect,’ inhibiting potential fair users of copyrighted works from exercising their 
fair use rights for fear of an infringement suit, especially in close cases.”); Yen, supra note 
62, at 397 (“Problems connected with separating idea from expression have caused many 
copyright decisions to rest upon the courts’ ad hoc sense of what is permissible copying 
rather than upon any tangible principles.  Such unprincipled decision making is constitu-
tionally suspect because it leaves courts and citizens uncertain about the contours of con-
stitutionally significant doctrine.  This uncertainty ultimately causes copyright’s unaccept-
able chilling effect.”). 
103 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 582. 
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aspect of commentators’ criticism of the idea/expression dichotomy 
and fair use doctrine as free speech safeguards is that because of their 
uncertainty, an actor will not be able to tell ex ante whether his po-
tentially infringing speech will be allowed and will thus choose not to 
speak at all,104 exactly the “kind of self-censorship [that] is traditional-
ly a matter of concern to the First Amendment.”105 
It is well recognized in the law and economics literature that “va-
gue standards cause overdeterrence.”106  Vagueness in laws that re-
strict speech have thus particularly troubled courts because overde-
terrence in such contexts significantly burdens First Amendment 
freedom of speech.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the freedom 
of speech is “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in 
our society. . . . The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise al-
most as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”107  Indeed, the 
Court has even stated that “standards of permissible statutory vague-
ness are strict in the area of free expression. . . . Because First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”108  Thus, a “cen-
tral tenet of First Amendment law is that speech restrictions should 
rest on standards that are as definite and nondiscriminatory as possi-
ble.”109 
Courts’ free speech concerns thus play themselves out with partic-
ular force in the copyright context where, as has been discussed,110 
 
104 See, e.g., Yen, supra note 62, at 424 (“[U]uncertainty creates three identifiable fears among 
individuals.  First, they may not know if their conduct is illegal.  Second, even if they cor-
rectly believe that their conduct is legal, the system may mistakenly punish them anyway.  
Third, even if individuals know that they will vindicate themselves, the mere cost of litiga-
tion alone creates a fear of what it might cost to protect constitutional rights.  These fears 
deter individuals from acting.”). 
105 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 545; see also Bunker, supra note 41, at 287 (“Robust free speech 
protection needs a sufficient degree of clarity so that a speaker may have some idea, in 
advance, if his or her speech will ultimately find protection in the courts or will occasion 
civil or criminal liability.”). 
106 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 94, at 1498.  Further, the tendency for vague laws 
to overdeter is not just observed by law and economics scholars, but is hinted at by courts 
as well, whose fear of vague laws and their tendency to overdeter is a part of the theoreti-
cal grounds for the “void for vagueness” doctrine.  See, e.g., Connally v. General Construc-
tion Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
107 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
108 Id. at 432–33 (citations omitted); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972) (“[W]here a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.”  (alterations in origi-
nal) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
109 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 4, at 203. 
110 See discussion supra Part III. 
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the supposed internal free speech safeguards are not “definite,” but 
rather riddled with uncertainty. 
Take, for example, the hypothetical documentary filmmaker used 
by Professor James Gibson in his article, Risk Aversion and Rights Accre-
tion in Intellectual Property Law.111  The filmmaker wants to use a piece 
of particularly poignant footage that makes incidental and transfor-
mative, but nevertheless potentially infringing, use of copyrighted 
material.112  The filmmaker has essentially three options:  (1) go for-
ward by engaging in fair use, risking liability; (2) take precautions by 
getting authorization; or (3) self-censor by minimizing use of the foo-
tage. 
Because of the uncertainties of the doctrine, the filmmaker will 
most likely not engage in fair use.  To rationally do so, the filmmaker 
would need to know the risk of liability.  If she knows ex ante that a 
court will find her use fair, she would without a doubt choose option 
one.  Or if she could estimate ex ante the likelihood of winning her 
fair use defense, she could calculate the expected cost of going for-
ward without authorization, weigh it against her expected benefit, 
and make a rational decision on whether to proceed.  But alas, to a 
“prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will prove to 
be infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante 
guidance.”113  There is no way for the filmmaker to predict whether 
she can successfully defend against a copyright infringement suit and 
thus no way for her to determine whether it would be in her best in-
terest to speak freely. 
Further exacerbating the situation, “[n]ot only is fair use famously 
ambiguous,” making the risk of liability impossible to predict, “but 
the price of making the wrong call is prohibitively high.”114  Losing 
the fair use argument and being found liable could mean “not only a 
permanent injunction, but a myriad of other sanctions—statutory 
damages, disgorgement of profits, [and] attorney’s fees.”115  Indeed, 
lawsuits, regardless of their outcome, are not cheap.  “[E]ven if her 
fair use claim would ultimately . . . prove[] meritorious,” the film-
maker could still easily be enjoined preliminarily,116 which would 
“bring her production to a screeching halt and force her to negotiate 
 
111 See Gibson, supra note 18, at 887–88. 
112 In Professor Gibson’s hypo, an interviewee stands in front of a famous building, holds a 
prominent magazine with its cover clearly visible, and sings the lyrics of a well-known song 
to make his point.  See id. 
113 Id. at 889. 
114 Id. at 890. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (“Injunctions issue as a matter of course in copyright cases.”). 
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permissions from those who hold her livelihood hostage.”117  Not to 
mention the fact that even absent a preliminary injunction, “a suc-
cessful fair use defense is expensive.”118  Of course, if the filmmaker 
could know ex ante that she will be found a fair user, she would go 
forward.  But of course, as noted, she cannot. 
Thus, due to “the vagueness of the fair use standard,” actors like 
Gibson’s filmmaker cannot “precisely discern[] the optimal level of 
investment.”119  And even if they could, “the expected cost faced by 
unauthorized users is likely to far exceed the expected, often quite 
modest, benefit.”120  “As a result, actors find it in their best interest to 
err on the side of safety,” refrain from engaging in fair use, “and ei-
ther overcomply,” i.e., self-censor, “or overinvest in precautions” such 
as licenses.121 
Licensing, in turn, is fraught with its own perils.  It is not a viable 
solution in cases “involving high transaction costs, strategic holdups, 
and unconscious or inadvertent copying.”122  And to make things 
worse, “th[e] ‘license, don’t litigate’ tendency” also allows copyright 
holders to expand their rights at the expense of users and the pub-
lic.123  So not only does the uncertainty of copyright’s supposed free 
speech safeguards deter speakers from speaking questionable-but-
possibly-non-infringing speech, but it also shrinks the amount of non-
infringing speech available to them.124 
IV.  IS UNCERTAINTY SUCH A BAD THING? 
Accordingly, some commentators’ solutions for reconciling copy-
right and the First Amendment focus on eliminating the uncertainty 
of copyright’s internal safeguards in some way.125 
 
117 Id. 
118 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 545; see also Gibson, supra note 18, at 894 (“[B]eing held liable is 
a secondary concern.  It’s being sued at all that poses the greater threat.”). 
119 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 94, at 1498. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  Note that even if an actor wants to take a chance on fair use despite its uncertainty, 
her publisher or distributor will likely not.  See id. (“[E]ven in cases where authors are 
motivated by ideological reasons to take a chance on fair use, their publishers and dis-
tributors are likely to oppose the idea.”). 
122 Id. at 1499. 
123 Gibson, supra note 18, at 891, 936. 
124 See id. at 887–906, 931–33. 
125 See, e.g., Bunker, supra note 41, at 297 (arguing for a particular solution utilizing a heigh-
tened substantial similarity standard because “it could offer greater protection, 
and . . . greater legal certainty, to speakers than the current ‘built-in’ protection regime”); 
Olsen, supra note 62, at 191 (“[T]he Supreme Court should clarify its own fair use rulings 
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However, while it is hard to deny the ambiguity and malleability of 
copyright’s internal safeguards,126 it may be that eliminating the legal 
uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine 
may, at best, do nothing for free speech, and at worst, further burden 
free speech interests rather than accommodate them. 
Critics of the free speech aspects of the idea/expression dichoto-
my and fair use doctrine rest their criticism on well-reasoned and es-
tablished free speech theory.127  However, recent behavioral studies 
exploring how people actually react to legal uncertainty may belie the 
basis on which critics have attacked copyright’s internal safeguards.128 
A. Uncertainty?  What Kind of Uncertainty? 
Generally, uncertainty in law is treated as a single category.129  
However, certain behavioral studies suggest that it should not.  Ra-
ther, “people perceive and are affected by different types of legal 
probabilities in distinct ways.”130  Uncertainty can be divided into dif-
ferent subcategories.  People face different kinds of uncertainty when 
dealing with the law and react differently depending on what kind of 
uncertainty they face.131 
 
in order to give the lower courts clear guidance as to the parameters of fair use and its 
importance in preserving First Amendment values.”). 
126 Even commentators that more or less support the adequacy of the idea/expression di-
chotomy and fair use doctrine as free speech safeguards seem to acknowledge that the 
concepts are amorphous and susceptible to becoming ambiguous.  See Denicola, supra 
note 54, at 315–16 (calling for an additional First Amendment privilege to support copy-
right’s internal safeguards despite finding that “[c]opyright law . . . long has respected 
the values inherent in the first amendment” and that “confrontation with freedom of 
speech therefore is not severe” because if copyright is “left to carry the constitutional 
burden unaided, it will become disfigured and eventually cease to perform effectively its 
traditional function”). 
127 See Olsen, supra note 63, at 189 (analogizing fair use to statutes affecting speech that have 
been found unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to their vagueness); Yen, 
supra note 62, at 421–34 (arguing that the uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy 
has a “chilling effect” on speech by analogizing the Copyright and First Amendment ten-
sion to libel cases); see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) 
(“Those . . . sensitive to the perils posed by indefinite language, avoid the risk . . . only by 
restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.  Free speech may not be so 
inhibited.”). 
128 See Yuval Feldman & Doran Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 980 (2009); Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited:  Legal Prediction and 
Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467 (2008). 
129 See Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 467 (“Legal scholarship . . . has traditionally treated 
uncertainty as a single category.”); see also Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980 
(“Generally, legal economists treat different legal probabilities as fungible.”). 
130 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980; see also Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 
467. 
131 See Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 467; Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980. 
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Professors Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman analyze certain 
recent behavioral studies and differentiate between “legal uncertain-
ty” and “enforcement uncertainty.”132  Professors Ehud Guttel and 
Alon Harel distinguish between “future uncertainty” and “past uncer-
tainty.”133 
B. Uncertain Law vs. Uncertain Enforcement 
Feldman and Teichman focus on the distinction between “legal 
uncertainty” and “enforcement uncertainty.”134 
Legal uncertainty is the uncertainty that results from either “the 
limitations of language” or “of ambiguous legal terms . . . that depend 
on a probabilistic ex post determination of an adjudicator.”135  To il-
lustrate “the limitations of language,” Feldman and Teichman use the 
example of “a law that forbids ‘vehicles’ from entering a park”—does 
it “appl[y] to bicycles, roller skates, or even toy automobiles”?136  
Faced with such a law, a bicyclist deciding whether to ride into a park 
faces uncertainty regarding the legal consequences of her choice—
whether her bicycle is a forbidden “vehicle.”137  “[A]mbiguous legal 
terms” include “terms such as ‘negligence’ in tort law, ‘good faith’ in 
contract law, and ‘fair use’ in copyright law.”138 
Enforcement uncertainty is the uncertainty resulting from the 
“difficulties associated with detecting wrongdoers and with assigning 
legal liability to them in accordance with different legal procedural 
rules.”139  For example, even if the bicyclist knows she is prohibited 
from entering the park because her bicycle is a “vehicle,” she still fac-
es uncertainty regarding whether she will be caught, and even if 
caught, whether she will be ticketed or merely warned and let go. 
Upon analyzing certain behavioral studies on how people react to 
uncertainty, Feldman and Teichman found that “people are less like-
ly to comply when uncertainty stems from the imprecision of law’s 
substance than when uncertainty stems from the imperfect enforce-
ment of clear law.”140  This is because “legal uncertainty undercuts the 
 
132 See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980. 
133 Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 467. 
134 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 984–85 (“[W]e wish to compare two sources of 
uncertainty regularly created by the legal system.  The first is legal uncertainty. . . . The 
second is enforcement uncertainty.”). 
135 Id. at 985. 
136 Id. at 989. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 985. 
140 Id. at 980. 
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law’s normative force and thus provides more leeway for people to 
justify self-interested behavior.”141  It “allows people to justify their 
choices to themselves by focusing on the possibility that their acts 
may be deemed legal,”142 while enforcement uncertainty involves “sit-
uations in which the illegality of an action is clear [which] leaves 
people with no choice but to view the behavior itself as wrong.”143  
Thus, legal uncertainty “result[s] in more noncompliance 
than . . . enforcement uncertainty.”144 
C. Legal Uncertainty and Prediction vs. Postdiction 
Guttel and Harel parse uncertainty into future uncertainty and 
past uncertainty.145  An actor faces future uncertainty when the uncer-
tain event succeeds his decision to act.146  He faces past uncertainty 
when the uncertain event precedes his decision to act.147  Thus, future 
uncertainty forces an actor to predict the future, while past uncer-
tainty forces him to “postdict” the past—that is, to retrospectively de-
termine what happened at the time of the event after the event has 
already occurred.148 
The distinction is important because “individuals treat postdic-
tions differently than predictions.”149  According to certain behavioral 
findings, people are more willing to take risks when faced with future 
uncertainty and asked to predict the future than when faced with past 
uncertainty and asked to postdict the past.150 
According to Guttel and Harel, this distinction between predic-
tion and postdiction has various implications for legal theory:  one 
such implication is its effect on the choice between rules and stan-
dards.151  For example, “in the context of constitutional rights,” the 
 
141 Id. at 1010. 
142 Id. at 1010–11. 
143 Id. at 985. 
144 Id. 
145 See Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 468. 
146 See id. at 468 (“For example, when purchasing a used car, the buyer could be uncertain of 
the date the manufacturer will terminate the production of this model (future) . . . .”). 
147 See id. (“For example, when purchasing a used car, the buyer could be uncertain 
of . . . the maintenance history of the vehicle (past).”). 
148 See id. 
149 Id. 
150 See id.  This difference in the way people treat predictions and postdictions is “grounded 
in deeply rooted behavioral dispositions.”  See id. at 471–79 (laying out and explaining 
“the experimental literature that explores how prediction and postdiction affect risk per-
ception”). 
151 See id. at 479–86.  Guttel and Harel also list other legal implications of the predic-
tion/postdiction distinction.  See id. at 479, 487–98. 
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“traditional legal preference” is “for specified and precise regula-
tions,” i.e., rules.152  It is traditionally thought that “vague legal norms 
operate to inhibit the exercise of freedoms” because “[u]ncertain 
meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly 
marked.’”153 
However, the behavioral findings on prediction/postdiction chal-
lenge this traditional approach.154  Since people are more willing to 
predict than postdict, “rules . . . may induce even greater inhibition 
of lawful behavior” than an equivalent standard.155  In other words, 
“an attempt to use legal rules may in fact increase rather than de-
crease the chilling effects of legal norms.”156  Thus, it may be that 
“where legislatures replace standards found to be void for vagueness 
with . . . rules designed to replace vague terms, they may paradoxical-
ly generate greater chilling effects than the chilling effects of the stan-
dards found to be void under existing doctrine.”157 
D. Copyright’s Uncertain Free Speech Safeguards Revisited 
While critics of copyright’s internal free speech safeguards find 
that the uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use, at 
best, prevents them from effectively protecting free speech,158 and, at 
worst, affirmatively “chills” free speech,159 the aforementioned beha-
vioral studies indicate that the legal uncertainty of the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine may in fact have no 
effect, or even, the beneficial effect of actually promoting free 
speech. 
The uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
doctrine complained about by First Amendment advocates is, in 
Feldman and Teichman’s taxonomy, “legal uncertainty,” rather than 
“enforcement uncertainty.”160  It is “uncertainty associated with the 
substance of the law,” and not that “associated with imperfect en-
forcement.”161  Commentators attack the ambiguity and fuzziness of 
 
152 Id. at 483.  Guttel and Harel point to “the doctrine of ‘void for vagueness’” as the “clearest 
manifestation of this preference.”  Id. at 483–84. 
153 Id. at 484 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)). 
154 See id. at 483. 
155 Id. at 484. 
156 Id. at 485. 
157 Id. at 484–85. 
158 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
159 See id. 
160 See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980. 
161 Id. 
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the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use162—“the imprecision of 
[the] law’s substance”—not their “imperfect enforcement.”163  In fact, 
Feldman and Teichman specifically mention fair use as an example 
of legal uncertainty in their article.164 
According to Feldman and Teichman, such “uncertainty creates 
an ideal setting for people who value themselves as law-abiding 
people to possibly justify, in their own eyes, not complying with the 
law.”165  Feldman and Teichman go further and suggest that “the un-
certainty created by standards . . . encourages people to violate 
them.”166  Standards provide a “window of legality” that “might attract 
some people to behave in a way that is not in accordance with the 
standard.”167 
While noncompliance with the law is usually undesirable,168 within 
the copyright/First Amendment realm a certain amount of noncom-
pliance with the law might not be so bad.  Due to the peculiar, ba-
lanced, yin-and-yang relationship between copyright and free 
speech,169 violation of copyright law, which probably harms copyright 
interests, actually furthers free speech interests.  Copyright bars certain 
speech.170  Not complying with copyright law thus produces certain 
speech.  If the First Amendment concern is “that copyright imposes a 
speech burden,” then noncompliance with copyright law is an in-
stance where that concern is forestalled—where speech is not de-
terred and “copyright’s speech-burdening effects” are avoided.171 
Thus, the legal uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and 
fair use doctrine may, rather than “chill” speech, actually allow for 
more speech by giving people that suspect their speech may infringe 
the wiggle room to justify speaking anyway.  Their uncertainty may 
actually invite a number of people to speak that would not otherwise, 
by allowing them “to view their choices ex ante as ones that may be 
 
162 See discussion supra Part III. 
163 See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 980. 
164 See id. at 988–89 (“This Article focuses on uncertainty created by the law itself. . . . [T]he 
law includes an array of standards that depend on ex post evaluation of actors’ acts in or-
der to impose legal liability.  Terms such as . . . ‘fair use’ in copyright . . . create uncer-
tainty regarding the legal consequences of an act.”). 
165 Id. at 1013. 
166 Id. at 1016. 
167 Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
168 Particularly in the areas of law mentioned in Feldman and Teichman’s article:  tax law 
and criminal law.  See id. at 1011–15.  Few would refute the desirability of having people 
pay their taxes and avoid committing crimes. 
169 See discussion supra Parts I–II. 
170 See discussion supra Part I. 
171 See Netanel, supra note 35, at 8. 
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determined by an adjudicator ex post to be . . . legal.”172  In this way, 
the legal uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
doctrine may actually allow for the creation and distribution of 
speech—speech that would otherwise not be produced if the balance 
between copyright and free speech were better defined.  In other 
words, the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine may be 
doing what they are supposed to be doing. 
Furthermore, in light of Guttel and Harel’s article on uncertainty, 
not only is there possibly no need to undergo the costs173 of reducing 
the uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy or fair use doctrine 
at all, but it is also possible that solutions to the copyright/free 
speech conundrum that add certainty to the idea/expression dichot-
omy and fair use doctrine may actually be counterproductive. 
A solution to the copyright/free speech conflict that adds certain-
ty to the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine would es-
sentially “[t]ransform[] a standards-governed activity into a rule-
governed activity.”174 
The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine are perfect 
examples of legal standards.175  They exhibit what Guttel and Harel 
indicate is the hallmark of legal standards:  future uncertainty.  Since 
it is impossible for a potential speaker to know whether her speech is 
copying idea and not expression, or is fair use or not,176 she must 
“predict” whether her speech will be considered by a court to be in-
fringing unfair use in the future.  Thus, the uncertainty facing a po-
tential speaker who faces copyright liability forces her to “guess the 
results of future events” rather than “guess the results of past 
events.”177  The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine are 
“open-ended norms” that “allow[] the adjudicator to make fact-
specific determinations.”178  While adding certainty will not automati-
cally convert the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine in-
to legal rules, “[t]he distinction between rules and standards is . . . a 
matter of degree.”179  It is undeniable that clarifying the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine will make them 
 
172 Feldman & Teichman, supra note 128, at 1017 (emphasis added). 
173 See id. at 1014 (“Reducing uncertainty entails direct costs.”). 
174 Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 482. 
175 See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 18, at 936 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy . . . and the fair 
use defense . . . are all standards.”). 
176 See discussion supra Part III. 
177 Guttel & Harel, supra note 128, at 498. 
178 Id. at 480. 
179 Id. 
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“more specific and concrete” and “leave[] less discretion to the deci-
sion maker than a standard,” making them more rule-like.180 
In other words, clarifying the idea/expression dichotomy and fair 
use doctrine will not eliminate the uncertainty an actor meets when 
deciding whether to speak in the face of potential copyright liability, 
but rather change it from future uncertainty to past uncertainty, thus 
changing the actor’s expected behavior as well.181 
While critics of copyright’s internal free speech safeguards believe 
that such a change would benefit First Amendment interests by eli-
minating the “chilling” effect of uncertainty, the behavioral research 
of Guttel and Harel suggest that it is quite possible such a shift from 
standard toward rule may actually increase the “chilling” effect be-
cause “[t]he uncertainty generated by the rule (past uncertainty) may 
be more chilling than the uncertainty generated by [the] equivalent 
standard (future uncertainty).”182  In other words, a clearer 
idea/expression line or fair use doctrine may actually deter more 
people from speaking. 
Guttel and Harrel use the example of a statute that makes it un-
lawful for someone to approach within eight feet of another person, 
and within one hundred feet of a health care facility entrance, for the 
purpose of protesting.183  They note that: 
[a] protester may be chilled from exercising his free speech rights not 
because the provision is too vague but because it is too precise.  Since it is 
difficult for a person to precisely evaluate the distance between herself 
and an object, a rule requiring a distance of “100 feet of the entrance to 
any health care facility” and “eight feet of another person” can be hard to 
follow.  The uncertainty generated by the rule . . . may be more chilling 
than the uncertainty generated by . . . a standard requiring the mainten-
ance of “reasonable distances.”184 
Rather than wonder whether a court will find that the distances she 
maintained were “reasonable,” a protester will instead wonder wheth-
er she is eight feet from another person, or one hundred feet from a 
health facility.  One question is not teleologically more “chilling” 
than the other. 
The same intuition applies to making the idea/expression dichot-
omy or fair use doctrine more rule-like.  It might not eliminate un-
 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 482 (“Transforming a standards-governed activity into a rule-governed activity 
transforms uncertainty . . . from future uncertainty into past uncertainty.  This change is 
likely to affect conduct.”). 
182 Id. at 485. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. 
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certainty as a whole, but merely substitute one kind of certainty, past 
certainty, for another, future uncertainty.  And the past uncertainty 
generated by making the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
more rule-like will not necessarily lessen their “chilling” effect on 
speech. 
Take for example, a safe harbor providing that “for any literary 
work consisting of at least one hundred words,” exactly “three hun-
dred words may be copied without the permission of the copyright 
holder.”185  Such a law could not be any more rule-like, it is seemingly 
impeccably “precise and predictable.”186  Yet even there, while the 
rule avoids the uncertainties of fair use analysis,187 a different kind of 
uncertainty takes it place. 
Even something as “precise and predictable” as a word count has 
its share of uncertainty.  I only mean to be quasi-facetious here—
determining word counts poses a real, though admittedly trivial, 
problem for real people.188  Take the preceding sentence for exam-
ple:  Microsoft® Word 2008 for Mac, version 12.2.7 and 
www.wordcounttool.com give a word count of twenty words, while 
Google Docs (http://docs.google.com) and www.wordcounter.net give a 
count of twenty-one.  Different word counting programs may give dif-
ferent results.189 
Thus, instead of wondering whether a court will find her a fair us-
er in the future, the would-be copier/speaker will instead face the 
prospect of having to wonder whether she had actually copied three 
hundred words or fewer in the past.  Working around this “uncertain-
ty” is probably easy, but I use it to illustrate a point:  that the uncer-
tainty of predicting the outcome of a fair use analysis may, in accor-
dance with the conventional wisdom, still be more “chilling” than the 
uncertainty of postdicting whether a word limit was adhered to, but, 
suggests Guttel and Harel’s article, it may not—one kind of uncer-
tainty is not intrinsically more optimal a deterrent than the other. 
 
185 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 94, at 1511. 
186 Id. at 1512. 
187 See id. 
188 See, e.g., FAQ:  What if There’s a Discrepancy Between What My Word Count Said and What Yours 
Comes Up With?, NATIONAL NOVEL WRITING MONTH, http://www.nanowrimo.org/
eng/node/402943 (last visited May 11, 2011); Why Do I Get Different Results from Different 
Word-Counters?, YAHOO! ANSWERS, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=
20100716221119AAhO1ei (last visited May 11, 2011). 
189 See, e.g., Why Do I Get Different Results from Different Word-Counters?, YAHOO! ANSWERS, 
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100716221119AAhO1ei (last visited 
May 11, 2011). 
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That is not to say the solutions already suggested by the literature 
are erroneous.  Rather, Feldman & Teichman’s and Guttel & Harel’s 
articles merely suggest that we may not know if the “solutions” are so-
lutions at all without further inspection.  The key insight to be gene-
ralized from Feldman & Teichman’s and Guttel & Harel’s highly con-
textual behavioral findings on uncertainty is that there are different 
kinds of uncertainty that affect people’s behavior in different ways.  
This Comment intends only to point out that attacks on the ability of 
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine to safeguard 
free speech have largely focused on uncertainty as a broad category—
an approach that may do copyright a disservice.  Feldman & Teich-
man’s and Guttel & Harel’s articles demonstrate that sometimes the 
conventional wisdom is wrong, that sometimes a rule is more “chilling” 
than an equivalent standard.  It is impossible to know whether this is 
the case for any of the proposed solutions for buttressing copyright’s 
internal free speech safeguards; however, it might be worthwhile to 
find out. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the common belief that only standards are uncertain and 
thus cause chilling effects, behavioral studies suggest that rules can 
induce even greater “chilling” effects.  With this in mind, the usual 
attack on copyright’s internal free speech safeguards should be reeva-
luated—or rather, further analyzed.  It may be that their supposed 
weakness is actually their strength.  It may be that courts have gotten 
it right—that copyright’s internals safeguards have been functioning 
effectively all along.  At the very least, recent behavioral studies sug-
gest that new considerations, overlooked by the conventional wisdom, 
should be explored when evaluating proposals for reconciling copy-
right and free speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
